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SAY CHEESE: HOW THE FOURTH AMENDMENT FAILS TO
PROTECT YOUR FACE
Antonio Vayas*
I. INTRODUCTION
From photographs and fingerprints to facial recognition,
technology has changed the tools available to law enforcement.1 Police
officers can now run an arrested individual’s DNA to determine if it
matches with DNA found in a previously unsolved case.2 As the
complexity of everyday technology grows (i.e., a new smartphone
coming out every year), so too does the difficulty of defining the proper
limits of law enforcement’s power to use information generated by
more complex technology. This Comment addresses one development
in particular—the availability of biometric technology on mobile
devices.
Opening a smartphone used to require inputting a passcode or
password.3 But on both the iPhone and the Samsung Galaxy, the two
most widely owned phones on the market,4 there are now two
additional, more popular, ways to open a phone. One can open his or
her phone using a fingerprint,5 or a face scan using the dimensions of his
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1 See Jeffrey Dastin, California Legislature Bars Facial Recognition for Police Body
Cameras, REUTERS (Sept. 12, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-californiafacial-recognition/california-legislature-bars-facial-recognition-for-police-bodycameras-idUSKCN1VX2ZP.
2 See, e.g., Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 465–66 (2013) (upholding a buccal swab
administrative scheme).
3 See, e.g., Dave Johnson, How to Lock Your iPhone with a Passcode, BUS. INSIDER (May
14, 2019), https://www.businessinsider.com/how-to-lock-iphone.
4 See Sudarshan, Most Shipped Smartphones in 2020: iPhone 11, Galaxy A51, Redmi
Note 9 Pro & More, GIZMOCHINA (Feb. 25, 2021), https://www.gizmochina.com/2021/
02/25/most-shipped-smartphones-2020-omdia.
5 See, e.g., iPhone SE, APPLE, https://www.apple.com/iphone-se/specs/ (last visited
Feb. 22, 2021); Galaxy S10, SAMSUNG, https://www.samsung.com/us/mobile/galaxys10/design (last visited Sept. 19, 2019).
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or her face.6 The phone then saves and stores this biometric
information.7
Indeed, a person’s phone is no longer just a contact book and a
device to make calls. Now, it is also a repository of a person’s intimate
information—including emails, photos, and even essential documents.
This development led to decisions, such as Riley v. California8 and
Carpenter v. United States,9 wherein the Supreme Court held that the
increase in intimate information contained in a phone, similar to that
found on a computer, made warrantless searches of phones
unconstitutional absent particular circumstances.10 The Supreme
Court’s stance in the two opinions, both authored by Chief Justice
Roberts, that mobile devices deserve increased protection has led to a
dispute over the extent to which a suspect’s phone and its contents are
legally protected.11
Riley touches upon certain aspects of this dispute.12 But Riley’s
holding was narrow, only covering a specific exception to the Fourth
Amendment.13 So while the Court emphasized a need for additional
privacy protections under the Fourth Amendment,14 the extent and
scope of said protections appear to be mostly lip service. Subsequently,
in Carpenter, the Court reiterated much of Riley’s rhetoric and analysis.15
But neither opinion provided a clear framework to the inclusion and
compulsion of biometric features, except for the broad stroke analysis
that phones should have some form of increased protection.
6 iPhone 11, APPLE, https://www.apple.com/iphone-11/specs/ (last visited Mar. 21,
2021); Use Facial Recognition Security on Your Galaxy Phone, SAMSUNG,
https://www.samsung.com/us/support/answer/ANS00062630 (last visited Mar. 10,
2021).
7 Curtis Moldrich, What Is Apples Touch ID and How Does It Work, TELEGRAPH (Oct.
16, 2014, 4:19 PM), https://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/apple/11167454/Whatis-Apples-Touch-ID-and-how-does-it-work.html.
8 573 U.S. 373 (2014).
9 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018).
10 See Riley, 573 U.S. at 403. A more thorough explanation of Riley and its impact
appears below. See infra Section IV.A.
11 See id. at 378; Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2214. The composition of the Court changed
from Riley to Carpenter, as Justice Scalia passed and Justice Gorsuch filled his seat.
12 See Riley, 573 U.S. at 401–03 (holding that the officer’s warrantless search was
invalid).
13 Id. at 402 (regarding the context of a warrantless search and the search incident
to a lawful arrest exception).
14 Id. at 395 (“[T]here is an element of pervasiveness that characterizes cell phones
but not physical records. . . . Allowing the police to scrutinize such records on a routine
basis is quite different from allowing them to search a personal item or two[.]”).
15 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220 (quoting Riley, 573 U.S. at 385) (“[C]ell phones and
the services they provide are ‘such a pervasive and insistent part of daily life’ that
carrying one is indispensable to participation in modern society.”).
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Consequently, lower courts have looked to the Fifth Amendment as a
possible source of a resolution.16 Further, state supreme courts have
begun weighing in, creating a 2-2 split as to what protections the Fifth
Amendment provides.17 Courts have not come to a consensus on what
protections the Fourth and Fifth Amendments afford defendants when
law enforcement seeks to compel the production of encrypted or
biometric information.18 In short, the situation is a mess.19
This Comment addresses whether a person can be compelled in a
search warrant or court order to open their phone using their biometric
information, and how courts are analyzing this question under both the
Fourth and Fifth Amendments. Further, it posits that a court’s use of the
Fifth Amendment’s Self-Incrimination Clause to answer this question is
improper and undermines the Fourth Amendment’s purpose. Part II of
this Comment describes the purpose and history of the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments. Part III discusses the technology used for biometrics and
how law enforcement has used this technology. Part IV then discusses
the Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence regarding
technology in Riley and Carpenter and how these cases may suggest the
Supreme Court’s direction on these issues. Then, it provides a brief
overview of the recent state supreme court split on compelled biometric
information and some scholarship surrounding the issue. Part V
discusses the implications of state supreme and lower federal courts’
respective applications of relevant case law and the issues at stake. This
Comment concludes that the U.S. Supreme Court’s failure to provide a
clearer framework has led to confusion and inconsistency. Analyzing
the inclusion of a person’s biometric features in a search warrant
ultimately invokes privacy considerations, and the Fifth Amendment is
ill-suited for the analysis. But in the absence of guidance from the
Supreme Court, courts should adhere to the warnings provided in Riley

16

See, e.g., United States v. Barrera, 415 F. Supp. 3d. 832, 838–42 (N.D. Ill. 2019)
(applying the Fifth Amendment to uphold a search warrant compelling the use of a
person’s biometric information); United States v. Maffei, No. 18-CR-00175, 2019 WL
1864712, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 25, 2019) (same).
17 State v. Pittman, 479 P.3d 1028 (Or. 2021); State v. Andrews, 234 A.3d 1254 (N.J.
2020); Seo v. State, 148 N.E.3d 952 (Ind. 2020); Commonwealth v. Davis, 220 A.3d 534
(Pa. 2019); Commonwealth v. Jones, 117 N.E.3d 702 (Mass. 2019).
18 Compare Barrera, 415 F. Supp. 3d. at 842 (upholding a search warrant that
compelled the use of a person’s biometric information relying on the Fifth Amendment),
with United States v. Wright, 431 F. Supp. 3d 1175, 1188 (D. Nev. 2020) (holding a
warrant that compelled a person’s biometric features violated the Fifth Amendment).
19 Orin Kerr, The Law of Compelled Decryption is a Mess: A Dialogue, REASON (Aug. 10,
2020, 11:36 PM) [hereinafter Kerr, A Dialogue], https://reason.com/volokh/2020/08/
10/the-law-of-compelled-decryption-is-a-mess-a-dialogue (writing that the New
Jersey’s recent decision in State v. Andrews left him “unable to say what the law is”).
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and Carpenter and treat technology, and in turn, biometric information,
with heightened protection.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATION
A. Fourth Amendment: Origins and Purpose
The purpose of the Fourth Amendment is to curb government
intrusion and protect citizens’ privacy. The Fourth Amendment states
that people have the right
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things
to be seized.20
At a bare minimum, the Fourth Amendment maintains that citizens have
the right not to be subjected to unreasonable searches and seizures.21
As for warrants, the text dictates that searches and seizures must be
justified by probable cause and not be generalized, but rather
particularized as to what is to be searched.22 Some have interpreted the
Warrants Clause, and the Fourth Amendment as a whole, to limit the
power of police to search persons or places.23 But determining the exact
scope of the Fourth Amendment is a tricky task.24
The Fourth Amendment grew out of the American Colonies’
aversion to British search and seizure practices, primarily with British
use of “writs of assistance” and “general warrants.”25 Before the Bill of
Rights, many state constitutions viewed the warrant “as an enemy, not
a friend.”26 This outright hatred of the warrant led to a series of
challenges with the common theme of protecting citizens from
“arbitrary government intrusion” and preventing government abuse of

20

U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
Id.
22 Id.
23 See Blane Michael, Madison Lecture: Reading the Fourth Amendment: Guidance
from the Mischief That Gave It Birth, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 905, 921–22 (2010).
24 Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 757
(1994) (calling today’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence “an embarrassment”).
25 Michael, supra note 23, at 907–09. A writ of assistance allowed an officer to
“search any place on nothing more than his own (subjective) suspicion.” Id. at 907–08.
While a general warrant similarly allowed officers “to search unspecified places or to
seize unspecified persons.” Id. at 909.
26 Amar, supra note 24, at 774 (quoting TELFORD TAYLOR, TWO STUDIES IN
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 41 (1969)).
21
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this power.27 But these challenges ultimately failed, and, as a result, the
combined effect of the failed challenges gave officers carte blanche to
search persons or places.28
Thus, the Framers established the Fourth Amendment with two
vital protections: (1) freedom from unreasonable searches and (2) a
requirement that any warrant must be supported by probable cause,
oath or affirmation, and properly particularized to what is being
searched.29 Yet, judges and scholars have conflicting opinions on
whether the Fourth Amendment establishes two separate protections
(unreasonable search protection and warrant protection) or one
general protection (where the absence of a warrant generally creates an
unreasonable search).30
Professor Akhil Amar explains that the framers intentionally
separated the Reasonableness and Warrants Clauses to delineate the
proper analysis of police searches.31 Professor Amar posits that the
Fourth Amendment makes clear that warrants are not the measure of a
proper search; the proper question is whether the search is
reasonable.32 Therefore, even if there is a “valid” warrant, it is still
unlawful “if the underlying search or seizure it would authorize would
be unreasonable.”33 The Framers included this limit to prevent any
potential abuses from judges issuing warrants, who are ultimately a part
of the government that the Fourth Amendment serves to check
against.34 The Warrant Clause only stipulates when a warrant is
appropriately issued—not that the presence of a warrant establishes
the search is presumptively reasonable, as some suggest.35
Thus, the “judge” of a reasonable search needs to be a jury, so a
genuinely independent body steers the inquiry.36 Revolution-era judges
viewed warrants as indemnifying the searcher, not serving as a
protection for a searched citizen, which further supports this
27

Michael, supra note 23, at 909–11.
See id. at 910–11.
29 See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
30 Compare Amar, supra note 24, at 762–70 (arguing that the absence of a warrant
during a search is not per se unreasonable, despite the Supreme Court insistence that
there is a warrant requirement), with Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390–91 (1978)
(evaluating a search’s reasonableness by asking first if the Government satisfied the
warrant requirement), and Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454–55 (1971)
(same).
31 See Amar, supra note 24, at 775, 782.
32 Id. at 801.
33 Id. at 774.
34 Id. at 773.
35 Id. at 774.
36 Id.
28
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proposition.37 And jury determinations of reasonableness ensured
proper judicial review of any search because the standard of review was
less deferential than a question of whether there was probable cause for
a warrant, as determined by a judge.38
But, in practice, the Supreme Court has approached the two clauses
as connected with the presence of a valid warrant insulating the
search.39 As such, Professor Amar’s history of the Fourth Amendment
may serve as more of an alternative theory. It remains notable because
it shows that, when evaluating a search, any inquiry ultimately comes
down to the reasonableness of the search.40
B. The Fifth Amendment and the Self-Incrimination Clause’s Origins
and Purpose41
At first blush, it may seem odd to discuss the Fifth Amendment
when the focus of this Comment is the Fourth Amendment. But often,
evaluating a Fourth Amendment challenge implicates an analysis of the
Fifth Amendment; therefore, it is necessary to discuss the origin of the
Fifth Amendment as well.42 Similar to the Fourth Amendment, the Fifth
Amendment derives from the Framers’ unwillingness to grant law
enforcement unrestrained powers to prosecute defendants.43
The Self-Incrimination Clause states, “No person . . . shall be
compelled to be a witness against himself.”44 Commentators differ as to
where exactly the purpose of this clause originates; some claim that it
was a product of an “outgrowth of the epochal change in criminal
procedure . . . as defense counsel entered the criminal courts,”45 while
others suggest it was a result of the convergence of competing criminal
procedural considerations.46 As a result, “the Fifth Amendment is an
37

See Amar, supra note 24, at 779.
See id. at 774.
39 See JOHN KIP CORNWELL, THE GLANNON GUIDE TO CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 69 (Wolters
Kluwer ed., 4th ed. 2019) (“Generally speaking, unless an exception applies . . . police
officers need a warrant[.]”).
40 See Amar, supra note 24, at 774.
41 For purposes of this Comment, there will only be a brief overview of the history
of this Amendment and the Self-Incrimination Clause.
42 See Michael S. Pardo, Disentangling the Fourth Amendment and the SelfIncrimination Clause, 90 IOWA L. REV. 1857, 1858–59 (2005); see also In re Search of a
Residence in Oakland, 354 F. Supp. 3d 1010, 1018 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (applying both Fourth
and Fifth Amendment analyses).
43 See Eben Moglen, Taking the Fifth: Reconsidering the Origins of the Constitutional
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 92 MICH. L. REV. 1086, 1086 (1994).
44 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
45 See Moglen, supra note 43, at 1088.
46 See id.
38
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unsolved riddle of vast proportions.”47 Regardless of its precise origin,
it is clear that Americans recognized limits on prosecutorial power,
including preventing testimony through coercion.48
The U.S. Supreme Court has held that the Self-Incrimination Clause
is a “protection against the prosecutor’s use of incriminating
information derived directly or indirectly from the compelled testimony
[of a suspect].”49 This protection is a reflection of the country’s
“‘unwillingness to subject those suspected of crime to the cruel
trilemma of self-accusation, perjury or contempt’ that defined the
operation of the Star Chamber, wherein suspects were forced to choose
between revealing incriminating private thoughts and forsaking their
oath by committing perjury.”50 While the purpose of the SelfIncrimination Clause may be somewhat unclear, the practical
protections evince an intent to limit prosecutorial power.
The Supreme Court has held that there are three elements of the
Self-Incrimination Clause’s protection: compulsion, incrimination, and
testimony.51 Compulsion has a malleable definition, but generally
prohibits someone from serving as a witness against himself and the
“extortion of information from the accused himself that offends our
sense of justice.”52 Incrimination refers to information that would
expose an individual to a criminal charge.53 Testimony is a more
complicated issue, especially considering the growth of technology and
how the types of information have continually changed. But Supreme
Court precedent refers to testimony as “diclos[ing] the contents of [the
criminal defendant’s] own mind.”54 Justice Holmes explained that this
protection means there is a “prohibition of the use of . . . compulsion to
extort communications from [the witness], not an exclusion of his body
as evidence.”55

47 Akhil Reed Amar & Renée B. Lettow, Fifth Amendment First Principles: The SelfIncrimination Clause, 93 MICH. L. REV. 857, 857 (1995).
48 Moglen, supra note 43, at 1118.
49 United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 38 (2000).
50 Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 596 (1990) (quoting Doe v. United States,
487 U.S. 201, 212 (1998)).
51 Caren Myers Morrison, The Intersection of Facebook and the Law: Symposium
Article: Passwords, Profiles, and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination: Facebook and the
Fifth Amendment, 65 ARK. L. REV. 133, 144 (2012).
52 Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 328 (1973).
53 Morrison, supra note 51, at 144.
54 Id. at 145 n.48.
55 Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245, 252–53 (1910).
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Taken together, the Self-Incrimination Clause can serve as a
powerful barrier to admitting certain statements from a suspect.
Consequently, the Fourth Amendment demonstrates the American
people’s hesitance in granting law enforcement broad powers. History
shows that as technology develops and the number of tools available to
law enforcement increases, a need arises to reconsider these
constitutional protections.
III. TECHNOLOGY AND ITS INFLUENCE ON LAW ENFORCEMENT
Technology has had a profound impact on the protections afforded
to Americans in the context of an arrest. When James Madison proposed
the Bill of Rights, the technology available to police officers would have
been inconceivable. This is why, as our reliance on technology has
increased, personal privacy has become an increasingly vital concern.56
This is especially true in the wake of something like the FacebookCambridge Analytica scandal.57
The fallout from the scandal
demonstrates the increased pressure on companies to guarantee that
information is not freely accessed without the proper protections.58
Thus, considering the profoundly intimate information on a person’s
phone, users benefit from the smartphones’ privacy protections. This
Part sets forth the current biometric protections in smartphones and
provides some modern examples of the privacy implications at play to
establish this issue’s precarious nature.
A. Smartphones and the Evolution of Passcodes
Passcodes used to open a smartphone are generally four- or sixdigit numerical personal identification numbers (PINs) or alphabetical
codes.59 But these security measures do not provide absolute protection
56 See, e.g., Privacy, APPLE, https://www.apple.com/privacy (last visited Dec. 22,
2020) (“Privacy is a fundamental human right.”); Rebecca Heilwell, Jeff Merkley and
Bernie Sanders Have a Plan to Protect You from Facial Recognition, VOX (Aug. 4, 2020,
2:00 PM), https://www.vox.com/recode/2020/8/4/21354053/bernie-sanders-jeffmerkley-national-biometric-information-privacy-act (the proposed act “would require
private companies and corporations to get written consent from people in order to
collect their biometric data”).
57 See generally Nicholas Confessore, Cambridge Analytica and Facebook: The
Scandal and the Fallout So Far, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 4, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/
2018/04/04/us/politics/cambridge-analytica-scandal-fallout.html. In 2018, the New
York Times and other news outlets discovered a data breach of millions of Facebook
users whose information was harvested and then sold by the former political consulting
firm, Cambridge Analytica. Id.
58 See id.
59 See Smart Phone Thefts Rose to 3.1 Million in 2013, CONSUMER REPS. (May 28, 2014,
4:00 PM), http://www.consumerreports.org/cro/news/2014/04/smart-phone-thefts-
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to the information in the device, as both four-digit and six-digit PINs can
be hacked within a matter of hours.60 Therefore, it is logical for
smartphone users to recognize that their information is potentially
vulnerable and be increasingly conscious of protecting their phones.
This awareness helps explain the implementation of stricter measures
to protect phones, such as biometric passcodes.
Biometrics are unique biological characteristics used to “verif[y]
the identity of a human being.”61 They are increasingly replacing PINs,
which are less secure.62 A smartphone using a biometric passcode
should only open for the phone’s actual owner after verifying the
physical feature registered with the phone.63 Apple popularized
biometric passwords in 2013 when Apple released its iPhone 5s.64
Apple equipped the phone with “Touch ID,” which allowed users to
unlock their phones with a fingerprint.65 Touch ID allowed users to have
a more secure passcode than the traditional four or six-digit PIN, with
the added convenience of just touching a button.66 Fingerprints are
unique to each person, and they are more unique than a person’s DNA.67
Theoretically, this ensures that a person’s phone can only be opened by
their unique touch.

rose-to-3-1-million-last-year/index.htm (observing that the most commonly used
passcode was a four-digit PIN).
60 See, e.g., Robert Hackett, How Long It Takes to Break a Passcode, FORTUNE (Mar. 18,
2016, 4:50 PM), http://fortune.com/2016/03/18/apple-fbi-iphone-passcode-hack
(showing the average times to hack alphabetical or numerical passcodes).
61 Colin Soutar et al., Biometric Encryption, in ISCA GUIDE TO CRYPTOGRAPHY 650
(Randall K. Nichols ed., 1999), http://www.cse.lehigh.edu/prr/Biometrics/Archive/
Papers/BiometricEncryption.pdf.
62 See Heather Kelly, 5 Biometric Alternatives to the Password, CNN (Apr. 4, 2014,
5:07 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/04/04/tech/innovation/5-biometrics-future.
63 See, e.g., About Face ID Advanced Technology, APPLE, https://support.apple.com/
en-us/HT208108 (last visited Feb. 13, 2020) (explaining the Face ID system).
64 See Press Release, APPLE, Apple Announces iPhone 5s—The Most Forward-Thinking
Smartphone in the World (Sept. 10, 2013), http://www.apple.com/newsroom/2013/
09/10Apple-Announces-iPhone-5s-The-Most-Forward-Thinking-Smartphone-in-theWorld.
65 Id.
66 See id.
67 See Khidr Suleman, How Secure Is Apple’s Touch ID?, IT PRO (Oct. 8, 2013),
http://www.itpro.co.uk/mobile/20728/how-secure-apples-touch-id. An identical set
of fingerprints has yet to be discovered. Anahad O’Connor, The Claim: Identical Twins
Have Identical Fingerprints, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 2, 2004), https://www.nytimes.com/2004/
11/02/health/the-claim-identical-twins-have-identical-fingerprints.html.
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But biometric passcodes did not stop at fingerprints, as Apple
released their iPhone X in 2017 and introduced “Face ID.”68 This
allowed users to save the dimensions of their faces to unlock their
phones.69 This creates a three-dimensional scan to compare a user’s
face and unlock the phone.70 This technology is so advanced that
between Face ID and Touch ID (and other brands’ equivalent features),
it is near impossible to unlock a phone without the proper scan.71
B. Abuses of Facial Recognition Technology and Privacy Issues at
Stake
Despite the rapid development of technology and the public’s
excitement over the convenience it brings, a concern arises when law
enforcement uses technology for policing. For example, California
legislators recently struck down a law that allowed police departments
to use facial recognition software in body cameras worn by police
officers.72 Legislators were concerned over citizens’ privacy and that
the technology available was not reliable enough.73 This concern over
privacy in the digital age has led to a more critical eye from the general
public on private companies and users’ information.74

68 Press Release, APPLE, The Future is Here: iPhone X (Sept. 12, 2017),
https://www.apple.com/newsroom/2017/09/the-future-is-here-iphone-x.
69 See Andy Greenberg, How Secure is the iPhone X’s FaceID? Here’s What We Know,
WIRED (Sept. 12, 2017, 5:08 PM), https://www.wired.com/story/iphone-x-faceidsecurity.
70 Id.
71 Id.
72 Rachel Metz, California Lawmakers Ban Facial-Recognition Software from Police
Body Cams, CNN, https://www.cnn.com/2019/09/12/tech/california-body-cam-facialrecognition-ban/index.html (last updated Sept. 13, 2019).
73 Id. (“Studies have shown, for instance, that the technology is worse at accurately
identifying women and people of color.”). This article may be underselling the
inaccuracies, as the Detroit Police Chief recently announced the recognition software
misidentifies someone 96% of the time. Jason Koebler, Detroit Police Chief: Facial
Recognition Software Misidentifies 96% of the Time, VICE (June 29, 2020, 12:56 PM),
https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/dyzykz/detroit-police-chief-facial-recognitionsoftware-misidentifies-96-of-the-time.
74 Notably, Senator Jeff Merkley and Senator Bernie Sanders have proposed a bill to
regulate the biometric information companies can collect from their consumers.
Rebecca Heilweil, Jeff Merkley and Bernie Sanders Have a Plan to Protect You From Facial
Recognition, VOX (Aug. 4, 2020, 2:00 PM), https://www.vox.com/recode/2020/8/4/
21354053/bernie-sanders-jeff-merkley-national-biometric-information-privacy-act.
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Examples of the abuses of facial recognition technology have led to
a variety of consequences. China, which is among the world’s leaders in
monitoring its citizens,75 recently required anyone who registers a
mobile phone to submit to facial scans.76 The justification for this
increased surveillance and use of technology is similar to that in the
United States—better protecting its citizens.77 In Xinjiang, home to
China’s internment camps for the Uighar Muslim population, there are
cameras and police checkpoints about every 150 feet.78 Chinese police
use these cameras to monitor citizens, cross-reference their faces, and
search citizens’ phones.79 The goal is to help Chinese police find Uighurs
who practice their faith and then send them to reeducation camps.80
Despite the potential “benefits,” the dangers of this type of surveillance
state are clear.
Even in less extreme examples, justifying a surveillance system
(even in a limited capacity) to protect citizens can lead to drastic
consequences. In 2019, New Jersey police officers arrested Nijeer Parks
for “shoplifting candy and trying to hit a police officer with a car.”81
Police identified Mr. Parks solely using facial recognition technology,
despite him being thirty miles away from the crime scene.82 Mr. Parks
was held in jail for ten days, and eventually all charges were dismissed
for lack of evidence.83 Law enforcement often justifies their use of facial
recognition technology by claiming that the technology was just another
tool used in the larger investigation.84 In practice, however, a match in

75

Paul Bischoff, Surveillance Camera Statistics: Which Cities Have the Most CCTV
Cameras?, COMPARITECH, https://www.comparitech.com/vpn-privacy/the-worlds-mostsurveilled-cities (last updated July 22, 2020).
76 James Griffiths, China is Rolling Out Facial Recognition for All New Mobile Phone
Numbers, CNN (Dec. 2, 2019 4:52 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2019/12/02/tech/chinafacial-recognition-mobile-intl-hnk-scli/index.html.
77 See id.
78 Matt Rivers & Lily Lee, Security Cameras and Barbed Wire: Living Amid Fear and
Oppression in Xinjiang, CNN, https://www.cnn.com/2019/05/08/asia/uyghurxinjiang-china-kashgar-intl/index.html (last updated May 9, 2019, 6:48 PM).
79 Id.
80 Paul Mozur, One Month, 500,000 Face Scans: How China Is Using A.I. to Profile a
Minority, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 14, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/14/
technology/china-surveillance-artificial-intelligence-racial-profiling.html.
81 Kashmir Hill, Another Arrest, and Jail Time, Due to a Bad Facial Recognition Match,
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 29, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/29/technology/facialrecognition-misidentify-jail.html.
82 See id.
83 Id.
84 Id. (“[I]t is used only as a clue in a case and will not lead directly to an arrest.”).
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the software can be the only evidence to link a suspect to a crime and
lead to false arrests.85
Despite these overwhelming privacy concerns, courts still have
often deferred to law enforcement and the benefits of technology. As
discussed below, Supreme Court precedent and lower courts’ treatment
of technology and access to biometric information demonstrate this
deference.
IV. LEGAL PRECEDENT AND BIOMETRIC INFORMATION
Federal appellate litigation concerning biometrics and
constitutional protections has been sparse; however, in a recent line of
Fourth Amendment cases, the Supreme Court has given some indication
on how technology and privacy protections interact and the type of
framework it could use for analysis. But despite some lofty declarations
from the Supreme Court, there remains some doubt as to the Fourth
Amendment adequacy in protecting a person’s face or other features, if
included in a search warrant. Consequently, courts have looked to the
Fifth Amendment and the Self-Incrimination Clause as a means of
protection. This Part focuses on this recent case law and attempts to
delineate the principles guiding the Supreme Court’s opinions through
its recent opinions concerning cell phones and the Fourth Amendment.
Then, it discusses an emerging split among state supreme courts
concerning compelled decryption. Finally, it explains how magistrate
judges are dealing with this issue, in practice.
A. Cell Phones and the Fourth Amendment: Riley v. California and
Carpenter v. United States
Riley v. California86 and Carpenter v. United States87 may appear like
resounding victories for personal privacy in the modern era. And in
some ways the decisions are; the Supreme Court concretely recognized
in both decisions that the cell phone is now almost a “feature of human
anatomy.”88 Riley illustrated how the Supreme Court weighs privacy
concerns in the wake of cell phones and that traditional Fourth
Amendment doctrine could not easily dictate the analysis.89 Carpenter
continued this trend and also declined to apply previous Fourth

85
86
87
88
89

See id.
573 U.S. 373 (2014).
138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018).
Riley, 573 U.S. at 385.
See id. at 385–91 (declining to extend Chimel and Robinson to cover cell phones).
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Amendment principles to modern technology.90 But ultimately, it is not
easy to discern how far these opinions go. It would be easy to
characterize both opinions narrowly, as courts have done. This Section
outlines the two opinions and highlights that while they may patently
appear like victories for privacy, the two opinions leave far too many
questions for lower courts to answer.
1. Riley v. California
In 2014, the defendant in Riley v. California challenged the search
of his smartphone incident to arrest.91 Riley showed that the Supreme
Court recognizes that privacy concerns are more apparent in the wake
of technological developments like these new minicomputers in
everyone’s pocket.92 The case began with a traffic stop, where an officer
discovered that the driver had been driving with a suspended license.93
This prompted the officer to conduct a full search of the driver incident
to the arrest, during which the officer seized the driver’s phone from his
pants pocket.94 The officer went through the phone and found some
indications that the driver was associated with the “Bloods” street
gang.95 After an additional search of the phone, the officer discovered
evidence linking the driver to a previously unsolved shooting. The
driver was ultimately indicted for the shooting and a related weapons
charge, and in turn, found guilty of the crimes charged. After the
Supreme Court of California declined to hear the case, the Supreme
Court granted certiorari.96
The Court attempted to balance the privacy interests at stake with
the legitimate government interest in solving crime.97 But the Court
decided to depart from the traditional Fourth Amendment analysis
because of the difference between physical objects, such as a car or a
coat, and digital objects, such as photos and texts saved onto a phone.98
Digital objects stored on a phone diminished the usual considerations of

90 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2216–17 (declining to extend Smith and Miller, cases
concerning the “third-party doctrine,” to the circumstances here).
91 Riley, 573 U.S. at 378. This categorical exception to the warrant requirement
allows for a contemporaneous search of a person incident to a lawful arrest. See United
States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973).
92 See Riley, 573 U.S. at 395, 401.
93 Id. at 378.
94 Id. at 378–79.
95 Id.
96 Id. at 380.
97 Id. at 407.
98 Riley, 573 U.S. at 400–01.
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officer safety and evidence preservation.99 The Government failed to
show, besides some anecdotal examples, that a normal arrest would
prompt either consideration.100 Further, the suspect’s usual diminished
expectation of privacy during a search does not apply to a cell phone
search because a cell phone is much more expansive and includes “vast
quantities of personal information.”101 Applying this framework, the
Court held that the privacy issues presented by a cell phone and its
contents outweighed the cost to law enforcement in preventing the
search.102
Notably, though, Chief Justice Roberts made clear that a search
warrant could include the searched information (the contents of one’s
phone).103 Additionally, law enforcement can use the same technology
that creates this protection to obtain warrants quickly enough to protect
the Government’s interests.104 Riley marked a transition in the Court’s
treatment of technology and the Fourth Amendment. Before Riley, it
was unclear whether the Supreme Court was prepared to square Fourth
Amendment precedent with digital information’s unique nature. The
Riley Court, with a near-unanimous majority, acknowledged that digital
data deserves a different level of privacy protection than physical
data.105 But just as quickly as the Court announced these principles, the
Court included enough caveats to hollow out the opinion.106
2. Carpenter v. United States
The Court followed up these lofty statements of just how intimate
information on a cell phone is in Carpenter v. United States.107 There, the
concern was over cell site location information (“CSLI”), which is
effectively an imprecise GPS monitoring system.108 In 2011, officers
99

Id. at 405 (Alito, J., concurring).
See id. at 387–90 (majority opinion) (“[N]either the United States nor California
offers evidence to suggest that their [safety] concerns are based on actual experience. . .
. We have also been given little reason to believe [remote wiping] is prevalent. The
briefing reveals only a couple of anecdotal examples of remote wiping triggered by an
arrest.”).
101 Id. at 386.
102 Id. at 386, 401.
103 See id. at 401.
104 Riley, 573 U.S. at 401.
105 Id. at 400–01. Justice Alito’s concurrence did express some doubt to the majority’s
analysis; however, he appeared more concerned that the legislature needed to step in
and dictate the proper protections. Id. at 407–08 (Alito, J., concurring).
106 Id. at 401 (majority opinion) (“Our holding, of course, is not that the information
on a cell phone is immune from search . . . a warrant is generally required[.]”).
107 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018).
108 See id. at 2211–12.
100
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compelled disclosure of certain telecommunication records for a fourmonth period, during which a string of robberies had occurred.109 Using
this information, officers were able to charge the suspect with
robbery.110 On appeal, the question was if this data collection even
amounted to a search under the Fourth Amendment.111 The Court
ultimately found that collecting CSLI data did constitute a search and
remanded the case to determine whether the search was reasonable.112
Chief Justice Roberts harped on the pervasive role cell phones play
in current society, as he did in Riley.113 Further, Fourth Amendment
precedent is difficult to rely on because when these cases were decided,
“few could have imagined a society in which a phone goes wherever its
owner goes, conveying . . . a detailed and comprehensive record of the
person’s movements.”114 Much like in Riley, the Court noted how
technology has changed society and that these types of questions do not
fit neatly into Fourth Amendment analysis. Yet, what Carpenter means
in practice is unclear, as the Court held that the vast amount of
information obtained in Carpenter would not be allowed, but did not
establish clear parameters for what would be allowed.
On their face, Riley and Carpenter appear to be big shifts in how
courts treat technology under the Fourth Amendment. But, as discussed
below, these opinions seem to be more narrowly interpreted and, as
such, are seemingly more lip service than prescient protection.
B. The Fifth Amendment as a Source of Potential Resolution or
Further Confusion?
At the outset, it is important to note that while this Comment
concerns the Fourth Amendment, the Supreme Court has tried to clarify
that the Fourth and Fifth Amendments are independent of each other.
But often, a Fourth Amendment question implicates the Fifth
Amendment as well.115 So, it is necessary to evaluate what protections
the Fifth Amendment provides. Thus far, only one state supreme court
has determined if compelled biometric information is protected under

109

Id. at 2212.
Id.
111 Id. at 2211.
112 Id. at 2222–23.
113 See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220 (Roberts, C.J.) (referencing his prior opinion in
Riley, Chief Justice Roberts stated that cell phones are “indispensable to participation in
modern society”).
114 Id. at 2217.
115 See Pardo, supra note 42, at 1858–59.
110
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the Fifth Amendment, and that court ruled that it is not.116 As discussed
below, lower federal courts have been inconsistent in this area.117 This
Section looks at how courts have applied the Fifth Amendment to
compelled encryption, as a general matter, for possible insight into the
proper framework for compelled biometric. In turn, this Section
explains that the split only further complicates the analysis of compelled
biometric passcodes,118 as demonstrated by a developing state supreme
court split. This Section concludes with some recent scholarship
theorizing how the Supreme Court may rule on compelled decryption
and what that may mean for compelled biometrics.
States have begun weighing in on compelled decryption,119 starting
from a Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts opinion,
Commonwealth v. Jones. These recent decisions are especially notable
because they suggest that, as the split grows, the U.S. Supreme Court will
review one of the decisions in the coming terms.120 This could lead to
clarification on how compelled encryption is treated under the Fifth
Amendment, and possibly some suggestions on how to analyze
compelled biometric information. But there are a few preliminary
points to set forth before discussing the cases.
First, state supreme courts have tried to answer two questions: (1)
is the password testimonial, and (2) is the Government compelling an
act to learn it? If the password is testimonial and the Government is
compelling an act to learn the information, the order would violate the
Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment. If the act is nontestimonial, then the clause is not implicated at all. Further, if the
Government already knows the implied speech, then the foregone

116 See State v. Diamond, 905 N.W.2d 870, 872 (Minn. 2018) (holding that the
defendant’s act of providing a fingerprint to unlock a cell phone was not testimonial
communication).
117 See, infra, Section IV.C.
118 See Orin Kerr, Compelled Decryption and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination,
97 TEX. L. REV. 767, 768–69 (2019) [hereinafter Kerr, Compelled Decryption]; see also
Kerr, A Dialogue, supra note 19.
119 Compelled decryption refers to when “investigators have a warrant to search a
cell phone or computer, but they cannoy execute the search because the data is
encrypted” by a password or passcode. Kerr, Compelled Decryption, supra note 118, at
768. Then investigators seek a “court order directing a suspect to” enter the password
to open the phone. Id.
120 Prior to publication, the Supreme Court denied certiorari of an appeal from
Pennsylvania. Commonwealth v. Davis, 220 A.3d 534 (2019), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 237
(2020). Before the denial, Professor Kerr suggested in a recent Twitter post that the
Supreme Court will likely weigh in on this issue in an upcoming term but is likely looking
for the right case to do so. See @OrinKerr, TWITTER (Sep. 25, 2020, 2:19 AM),
https://twitter.com/OrinKerr/status/1309379972356743168.
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conclusion doctrine applies.121 Second, the split itself is not clear cut, as
the bases for the four respective decisions differ. Thus, it could be
considered two related 1-1 splits, or one 2-2 split.122 This Comment will
characterize the approaches by the four courts as two approaches: (1)
the only implicit testimony when a suspect unlocks a phone is that the
suspect knew the passcode, and (2) unlocking a phone implies more
testimony than just knowledge of the passcode.
Thus far, Massachusetts and New Jersey have embraced the first
approach to compelled decryption.123 Under the first approach, a
suspect’s testimony, presented by unlocking their phone, is limited by
knowledge of the passcode, placing the compulsion under the foregone
conclusion doctrine.124 Essentially, because the Government already
knows the facts presented (the suspect knows their passcode),
disclosing those facts does not force a suspect to incriminate
themselves.125 This is because knowing the passcode does not reveal
anything about the actual contents of the device. Professor Orin Kerr126
provides an example to illustrate this point: If a person knows their
sibling’s passcode, they could comply with a court order to enter the
passcode. The only revelation from the passcode entry is that the
person knows the passcode and can unlock the device. Thus, the
contents of the device are still only known by the owner of the device.127
The only thing the Government needs to prove to force a suspect to
provide their passcode is that the suspect knows the passcode and can
access the device under the foregone conclusion doctrine.128

121 The Foregone Conclusion is an exception to the Self-Incrimination Clause.
Generally speaking, it is when the information compelled “adds little or nothing to the
sum total of the Government’s information.” Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 411
(1976). In practice, if “the facts implicitly disclosed through the act of production are
already known [by the Government], they are considered a ‘foregone conclusion’ and do
not force a defendant to incriminate himself or herself.” Commonwealth v. Jones, 117
N.E.3d 702, 709 (2019).
122 See Orin Kerr, Indiana Supreme Court Creates a Clear Split on Compelled Decryption
and the Fifth Amendment (June 4, 2020, 3:21 AM) [hereinafter Kerr, Split on Compelled
Decryption], https://reason.com/volokh/2020/06/24/indiana-supreme-courtcreates-a-clear-split-on-compelled-decryption-and-the-fifth-amendment.
123 See generally State v. Andrews, 234 A.3d 1254 (N.J. 2020); Commonwealth v.
Jones, 117 N.E.3d 702 (Mass. 2019).
124 Jones, 117 N.E.3d at 709–10.
125 Id. at 709.
126 The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court relied on both Professor Kerr’s Law
Review article regarding Compelled Decryption and Professor Kerr’s amicus brief in its
2019 decision. See id. at 711 (citing Kerr, Compelled Decryption, supra note 118).
127 Kerr, Compelled Decryption, supra note 118, at 779.
128 Jones, 117 N.E.3d at 710.
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The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, in applying this
framework, held that because the state created a strong inference that
the defendant knew the phone in question’s passcode, compelling the
defendant to open the phone did not violate the Fifth Amendment.129
The Supreme Court of New Jersey held similarly and added a key
criticism of the split’s other side. The Andrews court noted that the other
side of the split essentially conflated compelling production of the
passcode with the act of producing the contents, which imports Fourth
Amendment privacy principles into a Fifth Amendment inquiry.130
Then, the Supreme Court of New Jersey held that the only compelled act
of production is producing the passcodes, those passcodes have little to
no testimonial value, and this production fits squarely within the
foregone conclusion doctrine.131
The second view introduces an additional consideration: unlocking
the phone not only indicates knowledge of the passcode but also
recognizes that unlocking a “phone is a gateway to a treasure of
potential evidence.”132 The Indiana Supreme Court and Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania have supported this approach.133
The Indiana Supreme Court found that the documents produced
are inherently linked to the compelled production of the passcode. In
turn, the passcode creates two analogies: “First, entering the password
to unlock the device is analogous to the physical act of handing over
documents. . . . And second, the files on the smartphone are analogous
to the documents ultimately produced.”134 So, any time a suspect is
compelled to unlock their phone, they communicate three things: (1)
they know the passcode, as suggested in the first view; (2) evidence is
on the device; and (3) the suspect possesses that evidence.135 The
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania focused less on the consequences of the

129

Id. at 720.
State v. Andrews, 234 A.3d 1254, 1271, 1274–75 (N.J. 2020). It is important to
note that the Supreme Court of New Jersey “views the protection against selfincrimination as incorporating privacy considerations.” Id. at 1277.
131 Id. at 1274
132 Kerr, Split on Compelled Decryption, supra note 122; see also Laurent Sacharoff,
What Am I Really Saying When I Open My Smartphone? A Response to Orin S. Kerr, 97 TEX.
L. REV. ONLINE 63, 68–69 (2019) (explaining the slippery slope that opening a phone
creates).
133 See Seo v. State, 148 N.E.3d 952, 957 (Ind. 2020); Commonwealth v. Davis, 220
A.3d 534, 545 (Pa. 2019)
134 Seo, 148 N.E.3d at 957.
135 Id.
130
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compulsion than on the compulsion itself.136 The court held that
requiring a suspect to recall and then disclose a memorized password
reveals “the contents of one’s mind,” and so the password is testimonial
in nature.137 While the two courts had different rationales, they reached
the same conclusion that a passcode reveals more than just the fact that
the suspect knows the passcode.
As mentioned before, the law surrounding compelled decryption is,
quite bluntly, a mess. It is tough to reconcile that the first approach
ignores the practical effects that compelling a passcode’s production
reveals. But it is equally difficult to ignore that the second approach is
not directly rooted in current Fifth Amendment jurisprudence. Further,
as Professor Kerr posits in a recent article, the U.S. Supreme Court’s
decision on this matter could turn on the choice of these
characterizations.138 Accordingly, there is little benefit to parsing
through this muddled analysis to find the parameters for compelling
production of biometric features. In fact, the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania made sure to note that its decision did not address
biometric features.139 As a result, what is left is essentially a blank slate
for magistrate judges, which has exacerbated the unclear mix of
approaches.
C. The Principles in Practice and Magistrate Judges’ Inconsistency
After Riley and Carpenter, it remains unclear how biometric
passcodes fit into current Fourth and Fifth Amendment protections.
The Supreme Court in Riley outlined just how vital privacy protections
are to individuals and the information on their phones.140 Looking to
recent state Supreme Court opinions on compelled decryption only
complicates matters.141 And while the Fifth Amendment seems to
provide the best protection in accessing a person’s phone, so long as an
136 See Davis, 220 A.3d at 545. This situation is partially a mess because courts that
tend to come to the same result are analyzing the solution from different analytical
frameworks.
137 Id. at 548.
138 Orin S. Kerr, Decryption Originalism: The Lessons of Burr, 134 HARV. L. REV. 905,
960 (2021) [hereinafter Kerr, The Lessons of Burr] (“If compelled entry is treated as akin
to compelled production, then it may be barred by the Fifth Amendment. If compelled
entry is treated as akin to admitting knowledge of the password, then the rules for
compelled entry should match those for compelled disclosure of the password.”).
139 Davis, 220 A.3d at 550 n.7 (“[W]e need not address the related, but distinct, area
involving biometric features like fingerprints, thumbprints, iris scanning, and facial
recognition, or whether the foregone conclusion rationale would be appropriate in these
circumstances.”).
140 See Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 386 (2014).
141 See discussion supra Section IV.B.
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individual strictly uses a numerical passcode, that could change with a
potential Supreme Court decision on the issue. But, as this Section
shows, the Fifth Amendment was not designed to protect an individual’s
privacy, and this protection’s shortcomings are evident in recent
magistrate opinions and the inconsistent analysis of this issue. The
magistrate opinions analyzed in this Section present three approaches:
(1) applying the Fifth Amendment in place of the Fourth Amendment;
(2) applying the Fourth Amendment but focusing on solely the scope of
the warrant at issue; and (3) a hybrid of the two.
1. Applying the Fifth Amendment in Place of the Fourth
Amendment
Two recent opinions highlight the imperfect fit that relying on the
Fifth Amendment in lieu of the Fourth Amendment creates. Both
opinions ignored any privacy concerns and instead focused on whether
a fingerprint is compelled information.142
First, on review of a magistrate decision, the District Court for the
District of Idaho overruled a magistrate judge and held that the
biometric information sought was a “physical characteristic.”143
Regardless of the decision, the issue was that the magistrate judge
focused on and whether or not the fingerprint was a “compelled
testimonial communication.”144
This approach eliminates any
consideration as to whether compelled production of biometric
information amounts to a reasonable search. Further, as compared to
Supreme Court and federal circuit precedent, a fingerprint can be
justified as a non-testimonial act, as the district court judge noted in the
court’s holding.145
Second, in United States v. Barrera, the magistrate judge quickly
discarded any Fourth Amendment concerns because the warrant was
more limited than the usual challenges, and so did not address the
Fourth Amendment.146 The challenge, much like the one in In re Search
of a White Google Pixel 3XL Cellphone in a Black Incipio Case, concerned
the Government’s attempt to unlock a suspect’s phone using his
biometric information.147 The analysis the Barrera court used is

142

See In re Search of a White Google Pixel 3 XL Cellphone in a Black Incipio Case, 398
F. Supp. 3d 785 (D. Idaho 2019) [hereinafter Google Pixel]; United States v. Barrera, 415
F. Supp. 3d 832, 833 (N.D. Ill. 2019).
143 Google Pixel, 398 F. Supp. 3d at 793.
144 Id. at 790.
145 See id. at 793–94.
146 Barrera, 415 F. Supp. 3d at 835, 835 n.1.
147 Id. at 833–34.
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notable. The court assessed three considerations in evaluating the Fifth
Amendment protections: (1) whether biometric information is closer to
a key than a combination; (2) whether biometric information is more
physical than testimonial; and (3) whether the implicit inferences from
the biometric information can be considered testimonial.148 Following
precedent, the court found clearly established that a fingerprint is more
analogous to a physical key, especially in the context of using a
fingerprint to open a phone.149 Additionally, the court found that
because a suspect is not reciting any words and the Government is
dictating the compulsion, the process used none of the suspect’s
thoughts.150 Finally, the court found that the information provided by
compelled production of biometric features was not enough to warrant
the implicit inference of identifying the phone as someone’s property
because up to five different fingerprints can be programmed.151
The magistrate judge also explicitly referenced Riley v. California
and summarized why the magistrate could not rely on the Fifth
Amendment for privacy protection.152 The court recognized that old
analogies are not nearly as applicable as they once were; however, there
is no Fourth Amendment protection under typical Fifth Amendment
analysis, and Riley never addressed these same privacy concerns.153
Therefore, the court found that any broader interpretation of the Fifth
Amendment would diminish the purpose of the Fourth Amendment
because limiting access to evidence is squarely within the Fourth
Amendment’s parameters.154
This type of analysis is not limited to just these two courts155 and
shows how easy it can be to justify compelling production of a person’s
biometric information via the Fifth Amendment.
2. Applying the Fourth Amendment
In re Search of is one of the few cases that considers the Fourth
Amendment in its analysis. The warrant at issue sought “any” evidence
in cell phones and computers found upon the premises.156 This included
148

Id. at 838–39.
Id. at 839.
150 Id. at 840.
151 Id. at 841.
152 See Barrera, 415 F. Supp. 3d at 842.
153 Id.
154 Id.
155 See, e.g., United States v. Maffei, No. 18-CR-00175-YGR-1, 2019 WL 1864712, at *7
(N.D. Cal. Apr. 25, 2019) (holding that compelling the defendant to unlock their phone
via biometric information did not violate the Fifth Amendment).
156 In re Search of, 317 F. Supp. 3d 523, 525–26 (D.D.C. 2018).
149
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any devices that “reasonably could contain evidence of the offenses
under investigation.”157 The Government also sought an order
permitting law enforcement officials to unlock any device within the
scope of the warrant through the use of biometric passcodes.158 The
Government argued that obtaining an individual’s physical
characteristics does not infringe on their Fourth Amendment rights
because compelling production of these characteristics is not an
intrusion upon the individual’s privacy.159
The court set forth a standard to analyze this issue and noted that
there should be a nexus between the Government’s evidence and the
device trying to be searched.160 The court held that the Government may
compel the use of biometric features to unlock a device if there is
reasonable suspicion the suspect committed the crime, if the procedure
is “carried out with dispatch and in the immediate vicinity of the
premises to be searched,” and if there exists reasonable suspicion that
the suspect’s biometric information will unlock the device.161 The court
found all of these elements present and concluded that the Government
could compel the use of biometrics to unlock any devices found at the
premises.162
This case is interesting because the magistrate judge appeared to
reinforce the principles presented in Riley v. California, but then upheld
a warrant that allowed the use of biometrics for any device.163 The
conclusion seemingly counters the principles set forth by the magistrate
judge.
3. A Hybrid Approach Using Both the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments
These opinions each contain a muddled analysis. The through line
in the analyses is that these courts recognize the protections that the
Fourth Amendment and Riley afford but ultimately rely on the Fifth
Amendment in their conclusions.
First, in In re Search Warrant Application for [redacted text], the
district court disagreed with the magistrate judge, who had held a
warrant application unconstitutional because the warrant required any
individual present to provide fingerprints to unlock any device
157
158
159
160
161
162
163

Id. at 525.
Id. at 525–26.
Id. at 529.
See id. at 527–28, 528 n.3.
Id. at 533.
In re Search of, 317 F. Supp. 3d at 540.
See id. at 533, 540.
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discovered.164 The court relied on Touch ID’s time-sensitivity, noting
that waiting could lead police to be unable to unlock the phone using
Touch ID through several ways, such as a 48-hour wait period since last
unlocking the phone, someone remotely locking the phone, or the phone
turning off and being restarted.165 After balancing the interests at stake,
the court found that compelling the use of biometrics was reasonable.166
Further, the court noted “the intensity of the privacy interests at stake
in accessing smart devices,”167 and found that “although Riley certainly
instructs courts to avoid mechanical application of legal principles in the
face of technological advances, the constitutional text dictate[d]”
upholding the warrant.168
But the court, confusingly, did not rely on the Fourth Amendment
in its conclusion and explicitly did not address it.169 Instead, the Matter
of Search Warrant court upheld the warrant because the compelled
production of biometric information was not self-incriminating under
the Fifth Amendment.170
This hybrid approach has led to inconsistent results, as a similar
case with similar analysis led to the opposite conclusion. In In re
Residence in Oakland, California, the Government sought a warrant to
seize electronic devices and “to compel any individual present . . . to
press a finger . . . or utilize other biometric features.” to unlock those
found devices.171 The court in this case also noted the breadth of the
information sought and that any search would need to be much more
limited to comply with the Fourth Amendment.172 In its Fifth
Amendment analysis, the court disagreed that using a fingerprint to
unlock a device was akin to fingerprinting in the booking process for
two reasons.173 First, the fingerprint here replaced a passcode;
therefore, the fingerprint should be treated as a passcode because they
are functionally equivalent.174 Second, compelling someone to use their
fingerprint on a device served to identify the owner of that device.175
164

See In re Search Warrant Application, 279 F. Supp. 3d 800, 801–02 (N.D. Ill. 2017).
See id.
166 Id. at 806–07.
167 Id. at 806.
168 Id. at 806–07.
169 Id. at 807.
170 In re Search Warrant, 279 F. Supp. 3d at 807.
171 In re Search of a Residence in Oakland, California, 354 F. Supp. 3d 1010, 1013 (N.D.
Cal. 2019).
172 Id. at 1014.
173 Id. at 1015.
174 Id.
175 Id. at 1016.
165
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This, in turn, exceeded the physical evidence created when someone
submits their fingerprints for booking.176
A biometric feature is used “to access a database of someone’s most
private information.” For this reason, it is closer to “physiological
responses elicited during a polygraph test,” which are protected under
the Fifth Amendment.177 In deciding this case, the court emphasized,
relying on Riley v. California, that mobile phones are inherently different
devices and should have stronger protection.178 When law enforcement
officers open a phone, it likely contains significantly more information
than anticipated. Therefore, it could not be subject to the foregone
conclusion doctrine.179 This case illustrates many of the principles that
guided the Riley decision; however, these principles came in the form of
a Fifth Amendment protection.
This muddling is exacerbated as more courts rely on these very
decisions and create a starker split, further showing a need for
guidance.180 For example, in United States v. Wright, the District of
Nevada held a warrant unconstitutional by relying on In re Residence in
Oakland, California.181 But, another opinion—relying on the same cases
and reasoning—found a similarly constructed warrant constitutional.182
V. MOVING FORWARD
Riley v. California established that the modern smartphone is more
similar to a home than a telephone because of the immense amount of
private information contained in it—thus, smartphones deserve
increased protection under the law.183 Carpenter v. United States
confirmed the U.S. Supreme Court’s peculiar approach concerning these
devices. But now, the implications of these two cases and their broader
applicability are unclear, as exacerbated by the state supreme court split
regarding compelled decryption. Lower federal courts have attempted
to apply the Fifth Amendment, but there are some analytical gaps
inherent in using the Fifth Amendment in place of the Fourth
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Id.
In re Residence, 354 F. Supp. 3d at 1016.
178 Id. at 1017.
179 Id. at 1017–18.
180 Compare United States v. Wright, 431 F. Supp. 3d 1175, 1188 (D. Nev. 2020)
(holding that a warrant violated the Fifth Amendment by relying on the aforementioned
cases in this Comment), with In re Search of, 317 F. Supp. 3d 523, 539–40 (D.D.C. 2018)
(upholding a warrant, relying on the same cases).
181 Wright, 431 F. Supp. 3d at 1188 (citing In re Residence, 354 F. Supp. 3d at 1016).
182 In re Search of, 317 F. Supp. 3d at 539–40.
183 See Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 394–97, 401 (2014).
177

VAYAS (DO NOT DELETE)

2021]

5/25/2021 10:42 AM

COMMENT

1663

Amendment.184 Therefore, a few questions stem from biometric
information’s inclusion in search warrants: (1) are courts giving the
privacy considerations outlined in Riley the proper deference; (2) what
provides better protection, the Fourth or Fifth Amendment; and (3)
which amendment should be used, and why?
A. Privacy Considerations in Riley
First, the Framers created the Fourth Amendment to prevent
arbitrary and unreasonable searches.185 Riley establishes that absent
“exigent circumstances,” the Fourth Amendment protects cell phones
from warrantless searches.186 Further, the sheer amount of personal
information contained on cell phones creates a need for additional
protection.187 Therefore, there should have to be a compelling reason to
grant law enforcement access to such an intimate device. Otherwise, as
Justice Scalia188 and Professor Amar suggested,189 the freedom from
unreasonable searches provided in the Fourth Amendment will be
irreparably distorted.
Modern cell phones contain a multitude of intensely personal
information that may or may not be related to the crime being
investigated; therefore, digital data deserves an increased level of
privacy protection. It can contain someone’s entire life. The ability to
access this information needs to be reasonably limited to prevent law
enforcement from abusing their power. Based on Riley and Carpenter,
there appears to be support for this proposition.190 Chief Justice Roberts
made clear that cell phones are “indispensable to participation in
modern society.”191 Accordingly, the Court refused to apply the thirdparty doctrine to cell phones and their data and instead used a more
protective approach.192 But in both Riley and Carpenter, the Court made
sure to show just how narrow the opinions were.193 Consequently,
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See supra Section IV.C.
See Amar, supra note 24, at 773, 776–77; Michael, supra note 23, at 921–22.
186 Riley, 573 U.S. 373, 402 (2014).
187 Id. at 386, 407.
188 See Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 466, 482 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
189 Amar, supra note 24, at 801.
190 See supra Section IV.A for a discussion on Riley and Carpenter.
191 Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2220 (2018).
192 Id.
193 See id. (“Our decision today is a narrow one.”); see also Riley v. California, 573 U.S.
373, 402 (2014) (“Our holding, of course, is not that the information on a cell phone is
immune from a search[.]”).
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lower courts have flouted these considerations in favor of deference to
governmental interest.194
B. What Offers the “Better” Protection
The Fourth Amendment, as demonstrated above, provides little
protection to the inclusion of biometric information in search warrants.
Therefore, defendants have most successfully relied on the Fifth
Amendment to protect biometric information against unlawful
seizure.195 Among just the opinions explicitly mentioned in Part IV, five
ruled that the inclusion of biometrics in a search warrant was
reasonable, and two ruled their respective warrants were overbroad.196
Among the five that ruled that there was no constitutional violation,
three did not address the Fourth Amendment or its protections.197 Even
when a court found a Fourth Amendment issue, it ultimately relied on a
Fifth Amendment violation to deny access to the evidence sought.198
But in light of recent decisions, both on the state and federal level,
the Fifth Amendment’s reliability in compelled biometric information is
now in doubt. The recent state supreme court split will likely compel
the U.S. Supreme Court to evaluate the Fifth Amendment’s protection to
compelled decryption. Professor Kerr suggests that any ruling on this
issue would be a close call and depends on a choice of analogies.199
Further, this seemingly minute distinction between the characterization
of what law enforcement seeks to compel can be dispositive in
practice.200 And while only one state supreme court has weighed in on
compelled biometric information, the court ruled the Fifth Amendment
does not protect biometric information.201 So, while the Fifth
Amendment may initially appear as providing the best protection, it

194 See, e.g., In re Search of [Redacted] Washington, D.C., 317 F. Supp. 3d 523, 533, 540
(D.D.C. 2018) (agreeing, after balancing some factors, that the government interest
outweighed the defendant’s and upheld the warrant).
195 See supra Section IV.C.
196 See id.
197 See supra Sections IV.C.2, IV.C.3.
198 Id.
199 Kerr, The Lessons of Burr, supra note 138, at 960 (“If compelled entry is treated as
akin to compelled production, then it may be barred by the Fifth Amendment. If
compelled entry is treated as akin to admitting knowledge of the password, then the
rules for compelled entry should match those for compelled disclosure of the
password.”).
200 See supra Section IV.B.
201 See generally State v. Diamond, 905 N.W.2d 870 (Minn. 2018); see also supra
Section IV.B (discussing a recent state Supreme Court split regarding compelled
decryption).
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would be difficult to trust it will remain a viable option to challenge
compelled biometric information.
C. Lower Courts Are Improperly Relying on the Fifth Amendment
While possibly disappointing from a civil liberties perspective, the
lack of constitutional protection for biometric information seems
logical. The Fifth Amendment provides an imperfect framework to the
question. The Supreme Court has never applied the Fifth Amendment
to prevent the use of evidence that “did not involve compelled
testimonial self-incrimination,” 202 meaning that the Fifth Amendment
is definitively not intended to protect personal privacy. The Supreme
Court has held that Fourth and Fifth Amendment protections may
overlap in what they protect but has not addressed why they overlap.203
The overriding concern of the Fifth Amendment is to prevent compelled
self-incrimination, while the Fourth Amendment protects privacy
interests.204
Using the Fifth Amendment to protect biometric information has
been somewhat successful; it is apparent, however, that lower courts
have struggled with the fit.205 In In re Residence in Oakland, CA, and
United States v. Barrera, as discussed above, both courts relied on the
same principles to justify their respective holdings but reached opposite
holdings.206 Just because the Fifth Amendment may overlap with the
Fourth Amendment in the scope of their protections does not mean that
one amendment can be substituted for the other. The split in Residence
in Oakland, CA, and Barrera demonstrates courts’ confusion when
substituting the Fourth Amendment for the Fifth Amendment in
analyzing the use of biometric information in the process of a Fourth
Amendment search.
Further, the magistrate judge in Barrera referenced that a broader
application of the Fifth Amendment creates a murky constitutional
framework, and in turn, undercuts the purpose of the Fourth
Amendment.207 The Fourth and Fifth Amendments serve distinct
purposes, and muddling the two renders them redundant. Because of
this redundancy, if a challenge in this line of cases reached an appellate
202

Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 399 (1976).
See id. at 400.
204 See id.
205 See, e.g., United States v. Barrera, 415 F. Supp. 3d 832, 838 (N.D. Ill. 2019).
206 See id. at 839 (holding that biometric information was more akin to a key and not
testimonial); In re Search of a Residence in Oakland, California, 354 F. Supp. 3d, 1010,
1016 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (citing Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 764–65 (1966))
(holding that biometric information can establish guilt and was testimonial).
207 See Barrera, 415 F. Supp. 3d at 842.
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court, it is unclear if that court would even consider privacy concerns in
applying the Fifth Amendment.208 But the Framers created the Fourth
Amendment for this type of challenge. It was enacted to prevent the use
of general warrants that allowed law enforcement officers to search a
person and uncover something incriminating during the search.209
Analyzing the inclusion of something in a warrant is better suited for the
Fourth Amendment despite the lack of success in these challenges.
As the magistrate in In re Search Warrant Application suggested,
there needs to be some clarification to this framework.210 Determining
whether a search violates the Fourth Amendment should not hinge
solely on the inclusion of biometric information in a warrant but on
whether, under the particular circumstances, the search itself is
reasonable. As Professor Amar argues, reasonableness is the linchpin of
the Fourth Amendment, not a warrant requirement.211
This
reprioritization of reasonableness would allow Fourth Amendment
doctrine to keep pace with technological advancements. In its current
formulation, briefly assessing whether a search warrant application
included biometrics (assuming the relevant court chooses to apply the
Fourth Amendment) ignores a commonsense evaluation of the search
and its reasonableness.212 Accordingly, this focus on the Warrant Clause
and current reliance on the Fifth Amendment is another example of how
courts have weakened the protections the Fourth Amendment
provides.213
VI. CONCLUSION
Riley v. California established a need for some departure from the
traditional Fourth Amendment analysis in a warrantless search of a cell
phone and held that exceptional circumstances were required to search
the cell phone in that case.214 A similar level of rigor is also necessary
when law enforcement officers apply for a warrant that includes
biometric information. Cell phones are much closer to a computer than
the traditional phone they once were. Further, even something as
208 See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 399 (1976) (stating that absent a selfincrimination compulsion challenge the Fifth Amendment is inapplicable).
209 Michael, supra note 23, at 912.
210 See In re Search Warrant Application, 279 F. Supp. 3d 800, 807 (N.D. Ill. 2017).
211 See Amar, supra note 24, at 801 (“The core of the Fourth Amendment, as we have
seen, is neither a warrant nor probable cause, but reasonableness.”).
212 As Professor Amar argues, “[T]he Court’s obsession with warrants, probable
cause, and criminal exclusion has often made it difficult for the Justices to admit what
common sense required.” Id.
213 See supra, Section IV.B.
214 See Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 400–01 (2014).
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simple as the means to open a phone frequently changes. But lower
courts’ analyses have failed to fully embrace this idea.
Relying solely on a probable cause standard or the Fifth
Amendment dilutes the language of the Fourth Amendment and
subverts its original purpose—reasonable searches.215 With that in
mind, courts should consider if someone’s face or fingerprint should be
used to open something that could contain the equivalent amount of
intimate information that a person’s home does. Thus, in the absence of
clarification from the judiciary or Congress, courts should not compel
the use of biometric information for just any warrant, as they routinely
do. There should be a particularized device, person, and purpose in the
warrant, and a nexus demonstrating the link between the need for the
biometric information and the crime investigated.216 Further, courts
must more stringently consider the privacy implications at issue.
For that reason, until this issue is clarified, magistrate judges and
district courts need to ensure search warrants are properly tailored.
There should be a clear nexus between the search warrant, the device
implicated, and the crime investigated to avoid the dangers the Fourth
Amendment was enacted to prevent. Instead of rubber-stamping
biometric-inclusive search warrants, it is necessary to ensure the search
is reasonable—avoiding further dilution of the Fourth Amendment’s
protections and purpose.

215

See Amar, supra note 24, at 776–77.
See In re Search of a Residence in Oakland, 354 F. Supp. 3d 1010, 1014 (N.D. Cal.
2019).
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